The July Uprising was a collective outcry of the masses against unchecked dictatorship, widespread corruption, and the government’s complete lack of accountability. The New Bangladesh gained on August 5 urges us to reform the system in a way that ensures proper checks and balances on the government. A constitutional office that could be effective in achieving this system is the ombudsman. But in the 54 years since our independence, the office of ombudsman has never been put into practice. According to Article 77 of our constitution, the ombudsman is an office that aims to investigate the actions taken by ministries, public officers, or statutory public authorities. In essence, this serves as a watchdog, handling complaints made against the executive. The word �ombudsman� is originated from the Swedish word �ombuds,� which means representative or spokesperson.According to Article 77(3) of our Constitution, the Ombudsman will prepare an annual report concerning the discharge of his duties, and that report shall be laid before Parliament. This is the exclusivity of this institution. When such reports are submitted to Parliament, the entire concept of the investigation gains greater significance compared to other types of investigation reports or committees. Because, in this process, the representatives of the nation directly witness the administrative misconducts of the concerned public officials and the actions taken against them.

However, the challenge is that the constitution does not make it binding on the parliament to establish the ombudsman; rather, it leaves it to the arbitrary decision of the parliament whether to establish one. It is widely believed that the absence of an ombudsman is largely due to the bureaucracy�s lack of interest. As the current interim government considers constitutional reforms, mandating the establishment of the ombudsman mandatory in the constitution, rather than optional should be seriously considered. If that happens, the Parliament will be obligated to establish this constitutional office.

In 1980, the Ombudsman Act was enacted. Section 3(1) of this act states that the ombudsman will be appointed by the president on the recommendation of the parliament. However, it does not mention the process by which the parliament will recommend the ombudsman. If it is based on a simple majority, then the ruling party�s decision will prevail. According to Article 70 of our constitution, if any MP votes against their party, their seat will be vacated. This means the prime minister will have the final say in choosing the ombudsman, since all ruling party MPs are bound to follow party decisions. Instead of a simple majority vote in parliament, if the approval of two-thirds of all MPs is required, the appointment of the ombudsman will be much fairer and acceptable to both the ruling party and the opposition. Section 3(2) of the Act states that the ombudsman must have either administrative or legal knowledge. However, to effectively evaluate public officials, both are necessary, since their misconduct often involves both administrative indiscipline and legal loopholes. Section 4(1) of the Act states that the ombudsman can hold office for three years. This tenure is not sufficient, as some bureaucratic corruption cases are so extensive that they require longer investigations. Frequent changes in the ombudsman may disrupt the continuity and effectiveness of such investigations.

Section 6 characterizes the functional jurisdiction of the ombudsman. The ombudsman can investigate if someone claims they�ve been treated unjustly, or if an action resulted in unfair advantage or personal gain for someone. However, the working jurisdiction of ombudsman is still unclear here, as the type of injustice being referred to isn�t specifically stated. For example, the Anti-Corruption Commission (DUDOK/ACC) already investigates financial malfeasance and corruption cases. Because of this, the Ombudsman Act must specify explicitly whether the ombudsman would look into corruption as well or if their responsibility will be restricted to dealing with administrative incompetence and inappropriate conduct by public officials. The mere establishment of ombudsman will not result in any significant change if the legislation does not explicitly define the it�s duties and boundaries.

This particular section also bars the ombudsman from investigating judges or justices. This is important because allowing the ombudsman to investigate the judiciary would violate the principle of separation of powers. It would give the government the power to oversee the judicial system, which threatens judicial independence. Rather than expanding the current ombudsman�s jurisdiction to include the judiciary, a separate judicial ombudsman should be created to exclusively supervise judicial functions. The executive or government should have no influence over the appointment process of this judicial ombudsman. This approach is already in practice in several countries, such as Kenya or the State of Colorado in USA, where judicial ombudsman operate exclusively in judicial sector and executive ombudsman work within executive boundary.

According to Section 4(2), the ombudsman can be impeached by order of the President, based on a resolution passed by Parliament with a two-thirds majority, on grounds of proven misconduct or physical incapacity. Although the impeachment process is rigid, as it requires a high majority and proof of misconduct; however, the procedure for proving such misconduct should be clearly defined. This is important, as there could be conflicts of interest between the Parliament and the ombudsman during certain investigations. Therefore, a proper framework is needed to ensure the ombudsman can investigate without undue pressure.

Whether public access to the annual reports will be available is not mentioned in the Act. Since these reports contain details of proven misconduct by public officials, actions taken against them, and the ombudsman�s recommendations regarding policies and regulations, public access is very important. As Parliament is elected to fulfill the people’s will, public feedback can help shape better policies. Moreover, it will ensure an effective pressure mechanism on corrupt officials.

Since the outset, the Ombudsman has been a part of our constitution. But as of yet, no government has consented to put this into effect. However, in post-July era, public began to hold all institutions involved in public affairs accountable. Additionally, this institution is a watchdog who may ensure that the entire executive branch is properly monitored. Our political and executive environments will undergo substantial changes if the ombudsman is appointed and appropriate reforms are made to the statute. Ultimately, it will contribute to the creation of the July spirit, a state devoid of injustice, impoverishment, and corruption.